Isolating the Enemy: Diplomatic Strategy in China and the United States, 1953–1956 (Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University)
Tao Wang
In the crucial moment after the Korean War, the United States and the People’s Republic of China circled each other warily. They shifted between confrontation and conciliation, ratcheting up tension yet also embarking on peace initiatives.
Tao Wang offers a new account of Sino–American relations in the mid-1950s that situates the two great powers in their international context. He reveals how both the United States and China adopted a policy of attempting to isolate their adversary and explores how Chinese and American leaders perceived and reacted to each other’s strategies. Although the policy of the Eisenhower administration was to contain China, Washington often overestimated Chinese aggressiveness, worrying allies and neutral states. Sensitive to the differences within the Western camp, Chinese leaders sought to convince American allies to persuade the United States to back down. Wang analyzes diplomatic maneuvering over a peace settlement in Indochina, an American defense pact with Taiwan, and the anticolonial Bandung Conference, showing how political pressure pushed American leaders to make concessions. He challenges the portrayal of Communist states as driven by ideology, showing that Chinese leaders adopted a pragmatic policy during these crucial years.
Drawing on Chinese, Taiwanese, Russian, Vietnamese, British, and American archival material, including reclassified Chinese Foreign Ministry documents, Isolating the Enemy offers new insight into Chinese diplomacy in the 1950s and U.S. foreign policy under the Eisenhower administration through a nuanced portrayal of Sino–American interactions.
Tao Wang offers a new account of Sino–American relations in the mid-1950s that situates the two great powers in their international context. He reveals how both the United States and China adopted a policy of attempting to isolate their adversary and explores how Chinese and American leaders perceived and reacted to each other’s strategies. Although the policy of the Eisenhower administration was to contain China, Washington often overestimated Chinese aggressiveness, worrying allies and neutral states. Sensitive to the differences within the Western camp, Chinese leaders sought to convince American allies to persuade the United States to back down. Wang analyzes diplomatic maneuvering over a peace settlement in Indochina, an American defense pact with Taiwan, and the anticolonial Bandung Conference, showing how political pressure pushed American leaders to make concessions. He challenges the portrayal of Communist states as driven by ideology, showing that Chinese leaders adopted a pragmatic policy during these crucial years.
Drawing on Chinese, Taiwanese, Russian, Vietnamese, British, and American archival material, including reclassified Chinese Foreign Ministry documents, Isolating the Enemy offers new insight into Chinese diplomacy in the 1950s and U.S. foreign policy under the Eisenhower administration through a nuanced portrayal of Sino–American interactions.
Năm:
2021
Nhà xuát bản:
Columbia University Press
Ngôn ngữ:
english
Trang:
336
ISBN 10:
0231198175
ISBN 13:
9780231198172
ISBN:
2020052485
File:
PDF, 7.85 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2021
Amazon 
Barnes & Noble 
Bookshop.org
Bạn có muốn thêm cừa hàng sách? Xin liên lạc theo support@z-lib.fm
Chuyển đổi tập tin
Các kết quả tìm kiếm tiếp theo
Các lợi ích khác 
![Westad Odd Arne, Quinn-Judge Sophie (editors). — The Third Indochina War - Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79 (2006) [CASS SERIES: COLD WAR HISTORY]](https://s3proxy.cdn-zlib.se/covers200/collections/genesis/467215546a924737ff9de3e4d57618b51429514b4b53742ec55053d72cc5101e.jpg)
Từ khóa thường sử dụng nhất
Các mục liên quan
